This paper proposes a model selection procedure for choosing between two competing structural econometric models. The procedure is based on a novel lack-of-Þt criterion, namely, the simulated mean squared error of predictions (SMSEP), taking into account the complexity of structural econometric models. It allows for any estimator which has a √ n asymptotic normality or is superconsistent with a rate at n. The test is bi-directional and applicable to non-nested models which are both possibly misspeciÞed. The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is derived. The proposed test is general regardless of whether the optimization criteria for estimation of competing models are the same as the SMSEP criterion used for model selection. An empirical application using timber auction data from Oregon is used to illustrate the usefulness and generality of the proposed testing procedure.
Introduction
Model selection is an important component of statistical inference. It involves comparing competing models based on some appropriately deÞned goodness-of-Þt or selection criterion. For the competing models that can be estimated by (conditional) maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), there has been a vast literature on model selection procedures, such as the Akaike (1973 Akaike ( , 1974 information criterion (AIC), the Cox test (1961) and the Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test, to name only a few. Another important development is the use of the encompassing principle in testing non-nested models assuming that one of them is correctly speciÞed. See, e.g., Mizon and Richard (1986) , and Wooldridge (1990) , among others. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Gourieroux and Monfort (1994) and Pesaran and Weeks (2001) . In light of the development of new estimation methods in econometrics such as the generalized method of mements (GMM) and empirical likelihood estimation methods, which offer robust alternatives to the conventional MLE, recent work in model selection has attempted to develop procedures that can be used for models estimated by other methods than the MLE. For example, see Smith (1992) for extensions of the Cox test and the encompassing test to non-nested regression models that are both estimated by instrumental variables, Rivers and Vuong (2002) for the extension of Vuong's (1989) test to dynamic regression models, Kitamura (2002) for using empirical likelihood ratio-type statistics for testing non-nested conditional models, and Chen, Hong and Shum (2003) for likelihood ratio tests between parametric and (unconditional) moment condition models.
These model selection tests have been found useful in some of structural microeconometric models, which have been developed in the last two decades and applied in such Þelds of modern economics as labor and industrial organization.
1 For example Vuong's (1989) likelihood ratio test has been used to select structural models both of which are 1 Heckman (2001) gives an insightful discussion on the development and the issues on identiÞcation and inference of structural microeconometric models.
estimated by MLE. See, e.g., Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992) for testing collusive behavior, Wolak (1994) for testing asymmetric information, and Li (2004) for testing binding reservation prices in Þrst-price auctions, to name only a few. Also, Chen, Hong and Shum (2003) develop a test to distinguish between a parametric model which can be estimated by the MLE and an unconditional moment model which can be estimated by the empirical likelihood method, and then apply their procedure to choose between a sequential search model and a non-sequential model. Despite these interesting applications of the aforementioned model selection tests, there are many other situations in which these model selection tests may not be applicable.
2 Such a gap can be mainly attributed to the complexity associated with the nature of structural econometric models. Model selection criteria are formulated in such ways that they are calculated using sample information and compared between competing models. Most of the structural econometric models, however, are constructed based on economic theory which deÞnes maps between the latent variable of interest or/and its distribution and the observables. For instance, in structural auction models, it is assumed that the observed bids are Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategies which are strictly increasing functions of bidders' private valuations whereas identifying and estimating the private values distribution is one of the main objectives of the structural approach. The presence of latent variables and the complex relationship between the latent and observed variables deÞned by structural models make the formulation of a well-deÞned model selection criterion more involved. Moreover, in many cases, structural econometric models are constructed through moment conditions, meaning that 2 For instance, Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) develop a simulated nonlinear least squares estimator to estimate a structural model of Þrst-price auctions. They encounter a problem of determining between 11 and 18 potential bidders. This problem, signiÞcant from an economic viewpoint as having 11 bidders could imply the existence of a large trader and hence asymmetric bidding, calls for a formal test of non-nested models, as the structural models with different numbers of potential bidders are non-nested.
While this issue was not further pursued in Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) (see footnote 21 in Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) ), and cannot be addressed using the existing model selection methods, it can be resolved using our proposed procedure, as illustrated in the empirical application.
they are estimated not by MLE but by GMM or method of simulated moments (MSM).
Therefore, to accommodate these speciÞc features arising from the nature of structural models and the estimation methods, new model selection tests need to be developed.
Developing model selection procedures suitable in distinguishing between competing structural models is especially relevant in using the structural approach to analyze economic data and make policy evaluations. In the structural approach, policy analysis and the resulting recommendations are based on a structural model that is closely derived from economic theory assuming that the involved economic agents are in the environment described by the theory and behave according to the theory. As a result, it is pivotal to validate the structural model under consideration. For example, when analyzing auction data using the structural approach, an econometrician faces choices among different paradigms such as a private value model or a common value model. Even within a chosen paradigm, the econometrician may also need to determine an appropriate parametric functional form for the latent distribution. Furthermore, the researcher sometimes needs to choose between different equilibria if multi-equilibria exist, as is the case for models of two-stage dynamic games which yield a large number of Bayesian perfect equilibria (Laffont and Maskin (1990) ).
The goal of this paper is thus to propose a new model selection test in discriminating between competing structural econometric models. Our test is based on a comparison of the predictability of competing structural models. While the proposed test is related to the mean squared errors of predictions (MSEP), a lack-of-Þt criterion that has been used previously (see, e.g., West (1996) and Rivers and Vuong (2002) , among many others) in the framework of dynamic regression models, it differs signiÞcantly from those comparing predictability of alternative models in the context of dynamic regression models. First, we formulate the null and alternative hypotheses in terms of comparing (asymptotic) lackof-Þt of competing structural models based on a well-deÞned population predictability or lack-of-Þt criterion that is appropriate for distinguishing between competing structural models. Second, given that structural econometric models usually contain some latent variables that are unobserved, we propose to simulate these latent variables in order to make the predictions on the equilibrium outcomes. Also, since the simulation is used, when formulating the sample analog to those population quantities, we need to correct for the asymptotic bias term caused by the simulation, and hence propose a simulated MSEP (SMSEP) as a consistent sample analog to the population predictability criterion.
Third, because of the use of the simulations to generate the latent variables in predicting the equilibrium outcomes under competing models, our approach is easy to implement and greatly reduces the computational burden associated with the complexity of structural econometric models.
While some empirical work has used predictions from structural models to validate a particular choice of the model, because of the lack of a formal test, it has been based on an ad-hoc comparison of the closeness between the predictions and the observed outcomes.
The statistical signiÞcance of such a closeness is not assessed. In contrast, our testing procedure provides a formal framework in which the statistical signiÞcance of the difference in predictability of competing structural models can be assessed. Moreover, our model selection test allows for any estimatiors that are √ n asymptotically normally distributed, or are superconsistent with the rate n that can arise from some structural models (Donald and Paarsch (1993 , 1996 , 2002 , Hong (1998) , Chernozhukov and Hong (2001) , Hirano and Porter (2003) ). The test is bi-directional and applicable to non-nested structural models which are both possibly misspeciÞed. This adds a considerable advantage to the proposed test because in real applications, structural econometric models can be best considered an approximation but not exact modeling of the true data generating process. Nevertheless, with two possibly misspeciÞed models, our model selection procedure enables one to tell which one is closer to the truth. The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is derived.
The proposed test is general regardless of whether the optimization criteria for estimation of competing models are the same as the SMSEP criterion used for model selection. An easy-to-implement bootstrap based test is proposed for practical implementation when at least one of the estimators is obtained without minimizing the selection criterion, in which case the direct estimation of the variance of the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic may be computationally demanding. An empirical application using timber auction data from Oregon is used to illustrate the usefulness and generality of the proposed testing procedure.
It is worth noting that most of the recent work in model selection tests has been based on comparing the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC) between two competing models. See, e.g., Kitamura (2000 Kitamura ( , 2002 , and Chen, Hong and Shum (2003) . Our approach is different, as it is based on the simulated mean squared errors of predictions, a lack-of-Þt criterion. This is motivated by the fact that many structural econometric models are estimated by GMM or MSM other than the MLE, thus the KLIC cannot be used as a model selection criterion. Our model selection criterion, on the other hand, can be used for any estimation methods that yield estimators with root-n asymptotic normality, or with rate n superconsistency, and hence has an appealing generality.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general model selection framework for structural econometric models using the SMSEP criterion. The hypotheses for model selection are formulated. The asymptotic properties of the proposed test statistic are established. The practical issues arising from the implementation of the test are also discussed. Section 3 is devoted to an empirical application of the proposed test to structural auction models. Section 4 concludes.
An SMSEP Criterion and the Resulting Model Selection Test
Two models M 1 and M 2 are estimated using data {y i , x i }, i = 1, . . . , n, where y is a dependent variable and x is a 1 × K vector of covariates. Both M j , j = 1, 2 are structural models in the sense that for model M j , there is a p-dimensional vector of latent variables v j ∈ V j ⊂ IR p with the (conditional) probability density function (pdf)
θ j is in Θ j , a compact subset of IR K j , such that the observed dependent variable y and the latent variables v j have a relationship as a result of the structural model given by
3 As a result, the function H j (·, x, θ j ) maps v j to the equilibrium outcome y under model M j . For instance, in structural auction models where bidders are assumed to bid optimally according to the Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategies, the observed bids can be considered as an increasing function of bidders' private valuations. See, e.g., Laffont (1997) for a review on empirical auction models. Note that in addition to θ j , the parameters that appear in the (conditional) pdf of the latent variables, it is also possible to include in model M j some parameters that are not associated with the latent variable density provided that they can be identiÞed and estimated as well.
An example of this case is bidders' risk aversion parameter in auction models. Our model selection procedure can be readily adopted to this case, in which we can have
, where γ j is the parameter vector that is not associated with the latent variable denisty. Thus, for ease of exposition, we will focus on the case where each model M j contains only θ j . We have the following random sampling assumption.
n, are independently and identically distributed with
Þnite Þrst and second population moments.
Note that we make the random sampling assumption for the sake of exposition. Our proposed selection procedure can be readily extended to (weakly) dependent data, whose data generating process satisÞes the mixing conditions, such as those given in Gallant and White (1988) .
Letθ j be an estimator of θ j using the observations {y i , x i }. The estimatorθ j can be obtained from any estimation method with √ n asymptotic normality. SpeciÞcally, we have the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. For j = 1, 2, there is a unique θ * j inside the interior of Θ j , such thatθ j converges to θ * j in probability as n → ∞.
Assumption 3. For j = 1, 2, there exist K j × 1 random vectors U j,i , i = 1, . . . , n, with mean zero and bounded second absolute moments such that
where
Assumption 2 assumes the (weak) convergence ofθ j to a unique value θ * j inside the interior of Θ j . Since we allow both M j , j = 1, 2 to be misspeciÞed, θ * j , j = 1, 2, are called pseudo-true values as in Gallant and White (1988) . Assumption 3 gives an asymptotic linear representation forθ j that is satisÞed by most of the econometric estimators possessing root-n asymptotic normality (see, e.g., Newey and McFadden (1994) ). Later this assumption will be changed to accommodate the possibility that one or both estimators are rate-n superconsistent. We also make the following regularity assumption on the equilibrium outcome functions H j (v j , x, θ j ), j = 1, 2, which is satisÞed by most of the structural models studied in the literature.
To formulate a set of hypotheses that are properly deÞned in the framework of structural econometric models, we deÞne the quantity
where E y,x denotes the expectation taken with respect to the true but unknown joint distribution of y and x, and E M j denotes that the expectation is taken with respect to model M j , which may be misspeciÞed. Thus y − E M j (y|x, θ * j ) represents the prediction error from the conditional model M j . Q j (θ * ) is well-deÞned and Þnite because of Assumption 1.
Note that Q j (θ * j ) can be viewed as the (asymptotic) lack-of-Þt from model M j . Then within the classical hypothesis testing framework as adopted in Vuong (1989) , Rivers and Vuong (2002) , Kitamura (2000 Kitamura ( , 2002 , and Chen, Hong and Shum (2003), we can specify the following set of null and alternative hypotheses
meaning that M 1 and M 2 are asymptotically equivalent, against
meaning that M 1 is asymptotically better than M 2 in the sense that the former has a smaller (asymptotic) lack-of-Þt than the latter, or
meaning that M 2 is asymptotically better than M 1 .
From the formulation of the null and alternative hypotheses above, it is clear that our model selection is based on a comparison of the asymptotic lack-of-Þt, or predictability of the two (conditional) structural models under consideration. In essence, under the null, both structural models have the same asymptotic predictability, while under H 1 , model 1 has a better asymptotic predictability than model 2, and under H 2 , model 2 is better than model 1 with respect to the asymptotic predictability.
To test H 0 against H 1 or H 2 , we need to estimate Q j (θ * j ) using the observations {y i , x i }, i = 1, . . . , n. Let g j (·|x, θ j ) denote the pdf for y under model M j . Then Q j (θ * j ) could be estimated consistently bỹ
However, (3) can be difficult to compute because the functional form of H j (·, x j , θ j ) can be complicated, which leads to the computational burden in evaluating the integral. Similarly, (4) can be computationally intractable because the functional form for g j (·|x j , θ j ), the pdf for the observed equilibrium outcome y under model M j , can be hard to obtain as the result of the structural model leading to y = H j (v j , x j , θ j ) and so is the integral in (4). To address this issue, we note that
Noting that θ * j are unknown, but can be consistently estimated byθ j , we could replace the integral in (4) bȳ
are independent draws from f j (·|x j ,θ j ). Because of its nonlinearity, however, the following
does not converge to Q j (θ * ) for any Þxed number S j of simulations as the asymptotic bias caused by the simulations does not vanish. To correct for the asymptotic bias caused by the simulations, we deÞnê
Then we have the following result regarding the relationship betweenQ j (θ j ) and its pop-
Proposition 1. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. For any Þxed S j , as n → ∞,Q j (θ j ) converges to Q j (θ * j ) in probability.
As justiÞed in Proposition 1, for j = 1, 2 and any Þxed S j ,Q j (θ j ) consistently estimate Q j (θ thus the SMSEP we propose for model M j . It can be viewed as an in-sample SMSEP as it is calculated from the same sample that is used in the estimation. Alternatively, we can consider an out-of-sample SMSEP in the sense that the original data set is split into two parts, one part is used for estimation of the competing models, and the other part is used for calculatingQ j (θ j ) and hence for model selection test. Since within the framework considered here, the asymptotic properties of the tests based on in-sample and out-of-sample are the same, we will focus on the in-sample test based on (5) for ease of exposition. It is worth noting that usingQ j (θ j ) has the computational advantage as it can be readily obtained from the sample information with the help of simulations. Besides, as given in Proposition 1, it converges to the population lack-of-Þt criterion as the sample size approaches inÞnity for any Þxed number of simulations. This feature makes it a basis for constructing our test statistic below. Note that in estimating structural models of Þrst-price auctions, Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) and Li and Vuong (1997) have used bias corrections similar to (5) in constructing objective functions to be minimized that produce simulated nonlinear least squares estimators which are consistent for a Þxed number of simulations while the number of auctions approaches inÞnity. A novelty of this paper is to use (5) as a consistent sample analog to the population lack-of-Þt criterion in constructing a general test statistic for choosing between rival structural econometric models, not limited to auction models, as long as the structural models under consideration allow one to generate predictions from simulations.
In order to propose our test statistic, we deÞne T n ≡ √ n(Q 1 (θ 1 ) −Q 2 (θ 2 )). Then the next theorem establishes asymptotic properties of T n under our speciÞed hypotheses H 0 ,
Theorem 1. Assume Assumptions 1-4.
, where
and A j and U j,i are deÞned in (1) of Assumption 3.
(
Theorem 1 is valid in a general sense in that while the SMSEP criteriaQ j (θ j ), j = 1, 2, are used in constructing T n , the estimation methods that are used to obtainθ j , j = 1, 2, can be any resulting in estimators with √ n asymptotic normality. The estimators include those commonly used in practice such as the GMM estimators, the MSM estimators surveyed in Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) , as well as some semiparametric estimators surveyed in Powell (1994) . Moreover, the criteria that are optimized in estimation can be different from the SMSEP used as our model selection criterion. Such a general feature of our selection procedure leads to the consequence that the asymptotic variances ofθ j , j = 1, 2 in general contribute to the asymptotic variance σ 2 of T n , as reßected in the presence of A j , U j,i like terms in σ 2 . On the other hand, in some applications one or bothθ j , j = 1, 2 can be obtained by minimizing the same SMSEP criterion deÞned in (5) which is used as our model selection criterion. In these situations, the expression for σ 2 can simplify, as indicated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume Assumptions 1-4.
(i) Ifθ 1 is obtained by minimizing (5), then under H 0 , T n ⇒ N (0, σ 2 ), where
where B 2 and V n are deÞned in Theorem 1.
(ii) Ifθ 2 is obtained by minimizing (5), then under H 0 , T n ⇒ N (0, σ 2 ), where
where B 1 and V n are deÞned in Theorem 1.
(iii) If bothθ 1 andθ 2 are obtained by minimizing (5), then under
where C i is deÞned in Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 gives simpliÞed expressions for σ 2 when one or bothθ j , j = 1, 2, are obtained from minimizing (5), the SMSEP criterion. This can occur when one or both structural models are speciÞed using the Þrst moment conditions, and one or both estimators are simulated nonlinear least squares estimators resulting from minimizing (5).
Related examples are Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) and Li and Vuong (1997) . Most interestingly, if both estimators are obtained from minimizing (5), then σ 2 is the same as if θ * j , j = 1, 2, were known. As a result, σ 2 does not depend on the asymptotic variances ofθ j , j = 1, 2, meaning that the sampling variability attributed to the estimation of θ * j is (asymptotically) irrelevant in using T n to test H 0 .
As can be seen from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, in order to propose a test statistic that is operational, one needs a consistent estimator for σ 2 , the asymptotic variance of T n . Provided that one can Þnd such a consistent estimator, sayσ 2 , we have the following result.
Corollary 2. Assume Assumptions 1-4. LetT n = T n /σ.
As stated in Corollary 2, our test statisticT n has a nice asymptotic property in that under H 0 , it has a standard normal distribution asymptotically. Therefore, given a consistent estimateσ for σ, our model selection procedure involves computingT n and then comparing it with critical values from a standard normal distribution. SpeciÞcally, let α denote the speciÞed asymptotic signiÞcance level of the test and Z α/2 ≡ Φ −1 (1 − α/2), where
denotes the inverse cumulative standard normal distribution. If |T n | ≤ Z α/2 , then we accept H 0 . Otherwise, ifT n < −Z α/2 , we reject H 0 in favor of H 1 ; ifT n > Z α/2 , we reject
It now remains to discuss how to consistenly estimate σ 2 . In principle a consistent estimator of σ 2 can be obtained by replacing the quantities in Theorem 1 or Corollary 1 by their empirical counterparts. In particular, in case (iii) of Corollary 1, when both estimators are obtained from minimizing (5) and their sampling variation is asymptotically irrelevant to σ 2 , σ 2 can be straightfowardly estimated from the sample variation of C i , i = 1, . . . , n. This simplicity, however, disappears as soon as at least one of the estimators is obtained from some optimization procedure other than minimizing (5), as computational complications can arise from the need to estimate the terms B j in Theorem 1 that are associated with the derivatives ofQ j (·). To overcome the computational burden in estimating σ 2 , we propose to use a bootstrap procedure as a computationally convenient alternative. SpeciÞcally, in the general case where at least one of the estimatorsθ j are obtained without minimizing (5), the bootstrap procedure in estimating σ 2 consists in the following steps.
Step 1. Resample {y i , x i }; i = 1, . . . , n, with replications to get {y
i }; i = 1, . . . , n with b = 1, . . . , B.
Step 2. Use the sample {y
the same way as obtainingθ j , j = 1, 2, using the original data.
Step 3. For each b = 1, . . . , B, calculate T
, are the bootstrapped version ofQ j (θ j ), and deÞned as followŝ
Step 4. Calculateσ
By now we have maintained Assumption 3 which assumes the root-n asymptotic normality for the estimators obtained under competing models M j , j = 1, 2. Maintaining this assumption simpliÞes the presentation and discussion. While most of the estimators that are used in estimating structural models satisfy this assumption, another class of estimators, relevant to some structural models where the support of the dependent variable also depends on the structural parameters, can have n consistency, a rate faster than root-n. These estimators include those based on likelihood Paarsch (1993, 1996) ), Hong (1998) , Chernozhukov and Hong (2001) , Hirano and Porter (2003) ), and those based on the extreme order statistics (Donald and Paarsch (2002) ). It is worth noting that when one or both competing models are estimated by these rate-n consistent estimators, Theorem 1 not only remains valid, but also simpliÞes in a similar way to that in Corollary 1. The next corollary gives the corresponding results.
Corollary 3. Assume Assumptions 1-2.
(i) Ifθ 1 is rate-n superconsistent, butθ 2 is root-n and satisÞes Assumption 3, then
where B 2 is deÞned in Theorem 1, and
(ii) Ifθ 2 is rate-n superconsistent, butθ 1 is root-n and satisÞes Assumption 3, then
where B 1 is deÞned in Theorem 1, and
(iii) If bothθ 1 andθ 2 are n superconsistent, then under H 0 , T n ⇒ N(0, σ 2 ), where
As reßected in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3, our proposed model selection procedure can be used when the competing models are estimated by estimators that are either raten superconsistent, or have root-n asymptotic normality. Thus, it has generality and wide applicability. Moreover, when both models are estimated by rate-n superconsistent estimators, Corollary 3 indicates that the sampling variability attributed to the estimation of θ * j , j = 1, 2, does not affect (asymptotically) σ 2 , thus calculation of σ 2 greatly simpliÞes in the same way as in the case when both estimators are obtained from minimizing (5), though the reasons are different.
An Empirical Application
To illustrate the usefulness and feasibility of our proposed model selection procedure, we present an application from analyzing the timber sale auctions in Oregon organized by Orgeon Department of Forest (ODF). This data set has been analyzed in Li (2003) , which estimates a structural model within an independent private value (IPV) paradigm.
A particular feature of the timber auctions in Oregon, as noted in Li (2003), is the presence of the publicly announced reserve prices. As is well known, a structural auction model derived from the game theory assumes that bidders draw their bids dependent of the number of potential bidders. SpeciÞcally, within the IPV paradigm, as shown by Riley and Samuelson (1981) among others, the symmetric Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategy b m for the m-th bidder with a private value v m above the reserve price p is given by
where N is the number of potential bidders and F (·) is the private value distribution.
As in Li (2003), we consider 108 lots with different species grades and in different regions. Table 1 gives summary statistics on the data such as the appraised volumes measured in thousand board feet (MBF), the reserve prices, the regional dummies to indicate where the lots are located, the bids per MBF and the log grades. For more details on these variables, see Li (2003) . Also, following Li (2003), we assume that the private value density at the H-th lot be speciÞed as
where v m3 is the private value for the m-th bidder at the H-th auction, γ 3 = γ 0 +γ 1 grade 3 + γ 2 region1 3 + γ 3 region2&3 3 , and z 3 denotes the heterogeneity vector consisting of variables "grade", "region1" and "region2&3", where "grade" is for log grade to measure the quality, "region1" and "region2&3" are both regional dummies. As indicated from (7), to conduct the structural analysis, one needs to know the number of potential bidders. With the timber auction data in our case, however, we only observe the number of actual bidders, which is not the same as the number of potential bidders due to the fact that the bidders whose valuations are below the reserve prices will not submit their bids. In essence, when reserve prices are binding, the number of potential bidders, if assumed to be a constant across auctions, can be regarded as a structural parameter that cannot be identiÞed from the bidding model but from elsewhere. 4 To resolve the issue of not observing the number of potential bidders, Li (2003) assumes that the number of potential bidders is 10, which is the maximum number of actual bidders in the data set. To illustrate the application of the proposed model selection procedure, we consider another alternative assumption about the number of potential bidders which is N = 50. This assumption comes from the fact that there are in total 50 different bidders in the data. 5 Note that the resulting structural models from (7) with different number of 4 Determining the number of potential bidders in auctions with the presence of reserve prices is indeed a common problem facing empirical economists when analyzing auction data. See also the discussion in footnote 1. 5 My discussion with the expert at ODF also conÞrms that there are about 50 Þrms that could be potentially interested in timber auctions.
bidders N = 10 and N = 50 are non-nested. Assuming that N = 10, Li (2003) estimates the structural model under the speciÞcation (8) for the private value distribution using an estimation method based on the indirect inference principle originally suggested by Smith (1993) , Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) , and Gallant and Tauchen (1996) . 6 Now assuming N = 50, we re-estimate the structural model using the same method. Table 2 reports the estimation results. 7 It is interesting to note that only comparing the estimates from these two models with N = 10 and N = 50, respectively, does not allow us to distinguish between these two models, as the two sets of estimates are similar in both magnitudes and signiÞcance levels. Thus, to determine the number of potential bidders that better describes the bidding process, we apply our model selection procedure and obtain that the test statistic isT n = 2.10, with the formulation of H 1 as the model with N = 50 being preferred and H 2 as the model with N = 10 being preferred. 8 As a result, at the 95% signiÞcance level, N = 10 is preferred to N = 50. Also, note that it is possible that neither N = 10 nor N = 50 could be a correct description of the true number of potential bidders. For instance, we maintain the assumption that the number of bidders is a constant across the auctions. In reality, however, the number of potential bidders may vary across auctions. Nevertheless, since our model selection test allows both models to be misspeciÞed, we can conclude from the test that N = 10 is a better approximation than N = 50 for the number of potential bidders. In other words, the competition effect is better measured by N = 10 than N = 50. This application demonstrates the usefulness of our model selection procedure in selecting the competing structural econometric models.
The procedure proposed in Li (2003) consists in the OLS estimation at the Þrst step and simulation and parameter calibration at the second step. See Li (2003) for details. 7 For completeness and comparison, we also include the results reported in Li (2003) for the case of N = 10.
8 We obtain thisT n by using 100 simulations in calculating T n and using 800 boostraps in obtaininĝ σ. 9 Note that the use of the indirect inference type estimators in estimating our structural models and the complex feature of the structural model itself make it difficult to apply the existing model selection procedures here. This application demonstrates the generality of our proposed selection procedure. 
Conclusion
This paper develops a general framework for testing between competing non-nested structural econometric models. Our method allows for any estimators that are either root-n asymptotically normally distributed or superconsistent, and can be used for distiguishing between two models that are both possibly misspeciÞed. The statistical signiÞcance of the difference between two models under consideration is assessed through a simulation based lack-of-Þt criterion, taking into account the complex nature of structural econometric models. As such, our approach provides a new model selection method for choosing between competing structural models.
We apply our testing procedure to determine the number of potential bidders in the timber auctions in Oregon. Such an application illustrates the usefulness and generality of our test, and also demonstrates the importance of developing model selection tests in structural econometric models.
As previously mentioned, this paper is motivated by the need to develop a general model selection test for structural models when the estimation methods used do not allow one to use the existing procedures. On the other hand, because of its generality, our proposed method can also be applied to the cases in which the existing model selection tests work as well. For instance, when two competing structural models are estimated by the MLE, we can use the Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test as well as our test for model selection. Thus, it would be interesting in this case to compare the asymptotic properties of both tests as well as their Þnite sample performances. This is left for future research.
where Var M j (·) denotes the conditional variance given x under model M j , the second equality follows from the unbiased estimation of Var M jȲ j,i (θ * j ), and the conditional independence of y i and the simulations y Then Proposition 1 follows from (A.1) above and Assumption 2 thatθ j converges to θ * j in probability as n → ∞. 2
Proof of Theorem 1:
A Taylor expansion ofQ j (θ j ) around θ * j yieldŝ
whereθ j is a value betweenθ j and θ * j , j = 1, 2. We then have
where the second equality follows from thatθ j − θ * j → 0 in probability becauseθ j − θ * j → 0 in probability as assumed in Assumption 2, and that √ n(θ j − θ * j ) = O P (1) from Assumption 3, as well as ∂Q j (θ j )/∂θ 
where the second equality follows from Assumption 3 and the deÞnition ofQ j (θ * j ), j = 1, 2. Then (i), (ii) and (iii) follow from (A.3) and application of central limit theorem after some algebra. 2
Proof of Corollary 1:
Ifθ j is obtained by minimizing (5), then ∂Q j (θ j )/∂θ 0 j = 0 by the Þrst-order condition of the minimization problem. On the other hand, noting that θ * j is the probability limit ofθ j , lim n→∞ ∂Q j (θ * j )/∂θ 0 j = 0. As a result, lim n→∞ B j = 0. Then (i), (ii), (iii) follow directly. 2
Proof of Corollary 2:
The result directly follows from Theorem 1 and the assumption thatσ 2 is a consistent estimator for σ 2 . 2
Proof of Corollary 3:
Ifθ j is rate-n superconsistent, then √ n(θ j − θ * j ) = o P (1). As a result, (A.2) becomes √ nQ j (θ j ) = √ nQ j (θ * j ) + o P (1). (A.4) (i) Now ifθ 1 is superconsistent, butθ 2 is root-n and satisÞes Assumption 3, then (A.4) holds forθ 1 while (A.2) holds forθ 2 . It then follows that (A.3) becomes
Then the result follows from (A.5) after some algebra.
(ii) Now ifθ 2 is superconsistent, butθ 1 is root-n and satisÞes Assumption 3, then (A.4) holds forθ 2 while (A.2) holds forθ 1 . The result follows from an argument similar to that of (i).
(iii) Now if bothθ 1 andθ 2 are superconsistent, then (A.4) holds for bothθ 1 andθ 2 . As a result, (A.3) becomes
Then the result follows from (A.6) after some algebra. 2
